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Abstract		
This	article	categorizes	newly	created	and	proposed	EMU	institutions	according	to	a	new	typology	that	
broadens	 the	well-established	agent-trustee	distinction	 to	 include	 cooptation	and	orchestration	as	 two	
additional	modes	of	 indirect	 governance.	 Four	 empirical	 cases	 from	 the	 realm	of	 EMU	governance	are	
provided,	 i.e.	 the	European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM),	 the	European	Central	Bank	 (ECB),	 the	proposed	
European	Minister	of	Economics	and	Finance	(EMEF)	and	the	European	Fiscal	Board	(EFB).	The	article	asks	
how	we	 can	 explain	 that	 the	 institutional	 response	 to	 the	 euro	 area	 crisis	 has	 produced	 such	 diverse	
governance	arrangements.	Empirically,	it	shows	that	supranational	actors	like	the	European	Commission	
can	bypass	states	through	enlisting	existing	authority	to	deepen	European	integration.		
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I. Introduction	
The	euro	area	crisis	has	led	to	the	creation	of	new	institutions	like	the	European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM)	
(Gocaj	 and	Meunier	 2013;	 Ban	 and	 Seabrooke	 2017)	 and	 the	 empowerment	 of	 existing	 ones	 like	 the	
European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	that	took	over	the	responsibility	for	micro-prudential	supervision	of	 large	
banks	 (Howarth	 and	Quaglia	 2013;	 Epstein	 and	Rhodes	 2016;	De	 Rynck	 2016).	 Remarkable	 about	 this	
institutional	 change	 is	 that	 it	 played	out	against	 the	backdrop	of	member	 states’	 impaired	 capacity	 to	
delegate	more	sovereign	competences	to	the	European	level	due	to	increasingly	eurosceptic	mass	publics	
(Hooghe	and	Marks	2009;	Genschel	 and	 Jachtenfuchs	2016).	 Supranational	actors	managed	 to	expand	
their	authority	in	various	issue	areas	(Schimmelfennig	2014;	Bauer	and	Becker	2014;	Dehousse	2016).	The	
Commission’s	proposal	for	a	‘double-hatted’	European	Minister	of	Economics	and	Finance	(EMEF)	and	the	
newly	created	European	Fiscal	Board	(EFB)	are	indicative	of	a	broader	trend	whereby	supranational	non-
majoritarian	actors	bypass	states	to	deepen	European	integration	by	enlisting	existing	authority.	While	the	
EMEF	proposal	 tries	to	co-opt	the	existing	authority	of	 the	Eurogroup	President	by	making	him	a	Vice-
President	of	the	Commission	and	giving	him	control	over	budgetary	 instruments,	the	EFB	-	an	advisory	
board	 of	 the	 Commission	 -	 could	 enlist	 national	 fiscal	 councils	 to	 govern	 fiscal	 policy	 choices	 of	
governments	indirectly.	In	each	case	it	is	supranational	agency	trying	to	bypass	states	by	enlisting	existing	
authority	(Abbott	et	al.	2015a).	The	new	intergovernmentalists	predict	that	in	the	post-Maastricht	period	
competences	 are	 primarily	 delegated	 to	 de	 novo	 bodies	 like	 the	 ESM	 or	 the	 ECB	 ‘that	 often	 enjoy	
considerable	autonomy	by	way	of	executive	or	legislative	power	and	have	a	degree	of	control	over	their	
own	resources’	(Bickerton,	Hodson,	and	Puetter	2015,	705).	Accordingly,	these	bodies	‘fulfill	functions	that	
could	 have	 been	 delegated	 to	 the	 Commission’	 and	 their	 governance	 structure	 is	 often	 controlled	 by	
member	states	(Bickerton,	Hodson,	and	Puetter	2015,	705).	The	EMEF	and	the	EFB	examples	illustrate	a	
counter-strategy	 to	 circumvent	 the	 constraints	 imposed	 by	 the	 new	 intergovernmental	 dynamics	 on	
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supranational	agency.	‘Bypassing	states’	through	enlisting	existing	authority	is,	thus,	an	effective	way	of	
deepening	European	integration.						
The	 article’s	 empirical	 focus	 lies	 on	 institutions	 operating	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 EMU	 governance,	 i.e.	 the	
European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM),	the	European	Central	Bank	(ECB),	the	proposed	European	Minister	
of	 Economics	 and	 Finance	 (EMEF)	 and	 the	 European	 Fiscal	 Board	 (EFB).	 These	 four	 institutions	 are	
categorized	according	to	a	new	typology	proposed	by	Abbott	et	al.	(2018),	which	distinguishes	between	
agents,	trustees,	co-optors	and	orchestrators.	They	differ	in	terms	of	degree	of	independence,	mandate,	
legal	 enforcement	 tools	 and	 decision-making	 structure.	 This	 article	 asks	 how	we	 can	 explain	 that	 the	
institutional	 response	to	the	euro	area	crisis	has	produced	such	diverse	governance	arrangements	and	
what	its	downstream	consequences	are	for	the	future	of	EMU.	The	aforementioned	typology	enables	us	
to	delineate	the	scope	conditions	for	the	emergence	of	different	modes	of	indirect	governance.	The	article	
builds	on	a	comparative	qualitative	analysis	of	a	range	of	primary	and	secondary	sources.	Among	them	are	
reports	on	the	future	of	EMU,	EU	regulations,	directives	and	decisions,	 intergovernmental	 treaties	and	
relevant	 policy	 briefs.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 article	 is	 twofold.	 First,	 a	 plausibility	 probe	 of	 the	 theoretical	
framework	put	forth	by	Abbott	et	al.	(2018)	is	carried	out.	Second,	by	categorizing	different	institutions	in	
line	with	this	framework,	the	analysis	attempts	to	shed	light	on	important	theoretical	aspects	of	the	euro	
area	crisis	that	have	been	underappreciated	by	the	literature.														
The	article	is	structured	as	follows.	The	following	section	introduces	the	four	distinct	modes	of	 indirect	
governance	and	shows	how	they	are	intertwined	with	supranational	agency.	The	third	section	provides	
two	empirical	examples	of	member	states	granting	authority	to	an	agent	(ESM)	and	a	trustee	(ECB/SSM).	
The	 fourth	 section	 illustrates	 how	 supranational	 actors	 attempt	 to	 enlist	 existing	 authority	 to	 bypass	
states.	 The	Commission’s	 proposal	 for	 a	 European	Minister	of	 Economics	 and	 Finance	 (EMEF)	 and	 the	
Commission’s	decision	to	set	up	a	European	Fiscal	Board	(EFB)	are	given	as	examples.	Finally,	the	article	
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concludes	with	 a	 summary	 of	 the	main	 findings	 and	 its	 broader	 implications	 for	 the	 new	dynamics	 in	
principal-agent	relations	in	a	multi-level	governance	context	and	the	future	of	European	integration.								
	
II. Supranational	Agency	and	Indirect	Governance	
	
The	following	section	theorizes	under	which	conditions	a	certain	mode	of	indirect	governance	is	likely	to	
emerge.	Abbott	et	al.	(2018)	have	expanded	principal-agent	theory	to	include	different	modes	of	indirect	
governance	(see	Figure	1).	They	argue	that	a	principal	has	to	make	two	fundamental	choices.	First,	 the	
principal	needs	to	decide	whether	to	grant	authority	to	an	agent	or	whether	to	enlist	existing	authority.	
This	article	conjectures	that	especially	the	latter	option	is	an	effective	strategy	for	supranational	actors	
with	scarce	formal	authority	to	deepen	European	integration	(even	though	also	member	states	could	use	
this	strategy).	Enlisting	existing	authority	allows	supranational	non-majoritarian	actors	to	govern	without	
facing	 the	 veto	 power	 of	member	 states.	 Second,	 principals	 need	 to	 choose	 between	managing	 their	
indirect	governance	 relationship	 in	a	hierarchical	or	non-hierarchical	manner	 (Abbott	et	al.	2018).	This	
choice	is	subject	to	a	‘competence-control’	trade-off	(Abbott	et	al.	2018,	6).	A	principal	can	grant	an	agent	
significant	autonomy	to	develop	her	competence	which	might	make	it	more	difficult	to	control	the	latter.	
Thus,	when	 it	 is	particularly	 important	 to	minimize	agency	 loss,	 the	principal	will	opt	 for	delegation	or	
cooptation	 as	 the	 preferred	 mode	 of	 indirect	 governance.	 Agency	 loss	 occurs	 when	 the	 agent	
opportunistically	capitalizes	on	asymmetric	information	at	the	expense	of	the	principal	(Kassim	and	Menon	
2003,	122)	or	when	the	delegation	contract	provides	perverse	incentives	for	the	agent	to	permanently	be	
at	odds	with	the	principal’s	preferences	(Pollack	1997,	108).	Agents	that	engage	 in	capacity-building	or	
take	decisions	with	large	distributional	implications	will	either	(1)	be	tightly	controlled	by	the	principal	(the	
case	of	the	ESM)	or	(2)	attract	co-optors	that	want	to	have	more	influence	on	the	co-optee’s	decision-
making	 to	minimize	agency	 loss	 (the	 case	of	 the	Eurogroup	President/EMEF).	However,	when	credible	
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commitment	problems	need	to	be	solved,	the	principal	is	more	likely	to	prefer	a	non-hierarchical	mode	of	
indirect	governance	that	emphasizes	competence	over	control	such	as	trusteeship	or	orchestration.	The	
conventional	view	is	that	member	states	make	credible	commitments	through	delegation	to	independent	
trustees	like	the	supranational	ECB	whose	mandate	is	enshrined	in	the	EU	treaties.	However,	it	is	not	clear	
what	commitment	devices	supranational	actors	have	 in	 their	 toolkit	 if	 they	need	to	overcome	second-
order	problems	of	credible	commitment.	An	increasingly	‘political’	Commission	has	been	struggling	to	act	
as	a	credible	enforcer	of	EMU’s	fiscal	rule	framework.	Given	that	it	cannot	grant	authority	itself,	renewing	
the	credibility	of	its	commitment	was	achieved	by	setting	up	the	EFB	as	an	orchestrator	that	would	rely	on	
the	existing	authority	of	the	national	fiscal	councils	at	the	local	level.	Orchestrators	mobilize	a	voluntary	
intermediary	 ‘in	pursuit	of	a	 joint	governance	goal’	 (Abbott	et	al.	2015b,	722).	Orchestration	can,	thus,	
serve	 a	 dual	 purpose.	 It	 can	 be	 used	 to	 bypass	 states	 (avoid	 veto	 points)	 and	 to	 reaffirm	 credible	
commitments	at	the	supranational	level.											
	
Figure	1:	Supply	and	demand	conditions	of	indirect	governance	modes						
	 DEMAND	CONDITION	
SUPPLY	CONDITION	 Minimize	agency	loss	 Credible	commitment	
Member	states	granting	authority	 Delegation	(ESM)	 Trusteeship	(ECB/SSM)	
Supranational	actor	enlisting	
authority	
Cooptation	(EMEF)	 Orchestration	(EFB)	
Source:	adopted	from	Abbott	et	al.	(2018,	10)	
The	conventional	mode	of	delegation	has	been	the	conditional	grant	of	authority	by	a	principal	to	an	agent	
(Pollack	1997;	Thatcher	and	Stone	Sweet	2002).	The	advantage	of	a	P-A	relationship	is	that	the	principal	
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maintains	a	degree	of	control	because	it	can	sanction	the	agent	if	it	strays	beyond	its	mandate	(McCubbins	
and	Schwartz	1984).	Thus,	this	relationship	is	managed	hierarchically	ex	post.	Maintaining	a	tight	grip	on	
the	agent’s	decision-making	procedures	has	allowed	member	states	to	transfer	considerable	amounts	of	
paid-in	 capital	 to	 the	 ESM.	 By	 pooling	 financial	 resources	 member	 states	 can	 achieve	 substantial	
economies	of	scale	and	scope	that	would	not	be	attainable	in	the	absence	of	delegation.	Ultimately,	the	
ESM’s	 financial	 fire-power	will	be	 larger	 than	the	sum	of	 its	parts	due	to	 its	superior	credit	 rating	 that	
lowers	the	average	borrowing	costs.	Linking	the	dispersal	of	financial	assistance	to	conditionality	allows	
creditor	countries	to	minimize	the	risk	of	moral	hazard.		
In	 a	 trusteeship,	 ‘a	 trustor	 (principal)	 grants	 authority	 to	a	 trustee	 (agent)’	Abbott	 et	 al.	 (2018,	10).	 In	
contrast	to	a	P-A	relationship,	it	is	not	managed	hierarchically	because	the	trustee	usually	is	bound	by	a	
narrow	 mandate	 and,	 therefore,	 the	 trustor	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 hard	 means	 of	 controlling	 the	 trustee	
(Majone	2001;	Alter	2008).	This	can	cause	an	inversion	of	the	authority	relationship	ex	post	(Abbott	et	al.	
2018,	10).	During	 the	euro	area	crisis,	member	states	came	to	realize	 that	 they	were	 issuing	debt	 in	a	
currency	 they	 had	 no	 control	 over	 anymore	 (De	 Grauwe	 2013).	 They	 had	 delegated	 the	 conduct	 of	
monetary	policy	to	an	independent	trustee	only	to	find	that	ex	post	the	ECB	could	use	its	authority	to	act	
as	a	lender	of	last	resort	in	order	to	impose	conditionality	on	its	trustors.	Nevertheless,	the	initial	grant	of	
authority	was	necessary	to	credibly	commit	to	price	stability.	Only	if	the	trustor	delegates	the	full	authority	
over	decision-making	and	enforcement	 in	a	given	policy	area	 to	an	 independent	 trustee	can	 the	 time-
inconsistency	problem	be	overcome	(Majone	2001).	This	was	also	a	crucial	motivation	for	entrusting	the	
Single	Supervisory	Mechanism	(SSM)	with	the	task	of	micro-prudential	supervision	of	significant	banks	in	
the	euro	area	(Howarth	and	Quaglia	2015).	Dehousse	(2016,	626)	argues	that	‘north-south	mistrust	had	
reached	such	high	levels	that	creditor	countries	insisted	on	a	depoliticisation	of	enforcement	mechanisms’.	
However,	 overcoming	national	 supervisory	 forbearance	 and	 the	breaking	 of	 the	 sovereign-bank	nexus	
could	only	be	credibly	achieved	if	the	new	arrangement	was	acting	completely	independent	of	political	
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interference.	 Thus,	 the	 solution	was	made	 to	 entrust	 the	 ECB	 as	 a	 trustee	with	 this	 task	 and	 not	 the	
European	Banking	Authority	(EBA).				
There	are	several	reasons	why	enlisting	authority	is	an	effective	strategy	deployed	by	supranational	actors	
to	deepen	integration.	First,	granting	authority	is	an	unattractive	option	for	supranational	actors	because	
authority	 is	 a	 scarce	 resource	 for	 them	 and	 its	 delegation	 is	 legally	 constrained	 (i.e.	 by	 the	 Meroni	
doctrine).	Second,	enlisting	existing	authority	allows	them	to	deepen	integration	without	facing	potential	
veto	 points	 controlled	 by	 member	 states.	 Third,	 it	 neither	 entails	 the	 mobilization	 of	 large	 financial	
resources	nor	does	it	require	comprehensive	monitoring.	Fourth,	under	cooptation	‘a	co-optor	(principal)	
enlists	a	co-optee	(agent)	with	existing	authority	over	particular	targets;	once	enlisted,	however,	the	co-
optee	is	subject	to	the	co-optor’s	hierarchical	control’	(Abbott	et	al.	2018,	11).	In	order	to	enlist	the	co-
optee’s	authority	the	co-opter	lures	the	former	into	the	relationship	by	promising	to	boost	its	standing	
and	wealth	 (Abbott	 et	 al.	 2018,	 11).	 After	 the	 co-optor	 ‘got	 a	 foot	 in	 the	 door’	 she	 can	 increase	 her	
authority	 over	 time.	 The	 European	 Commission’s	 proposal	 to	 make	 the	 Eurogroup	 President	 a	 Vice-
President	of	the	Commission	(‘a	double-hatted	EMEF’)	follows	the	cooptation	pattern.	By	supporting	the	
Eurogroup	 President	 (co-optee)	with	 additional	 competences	 (such	 as	 a	 future	 euro	 area	 budget)	 the	
Commission	(co-optor)	tries	to	enlist	its	existing	authority.	Over	time,	however,	the	Eurogroup	President’s	
dependence	on	the	Commission	might	grow	and	the	authority	relationship	could	be	inversed.	Thus	far,	
the	Eurogroup	President	 is	chosen	 intergovernmentally	among	the	Finance	Ministers	of	 the	euro	area.	
Cooptation	could	turn	this	into	an	office	that	gradually	shifts	its	loyalty	towards	the	supranational	level	as	
the	dependence	on	the	Commission	grows.															
The	fourth	mode	of	indirect	governance	is	orchestration.	Orchestrators	mobilize	a	voluntary	intermediary	
‘in	pursuit	of	a	joint	governance	goal’	(Abbott	et	al.	2015b,	722).	Like	the	co-optor,	the	orchestrator	lacks	
hard	policy	 instruments	 to	govern	a	 target	directly	 (Abbott	et	 al.	 2015b,	720;	2018,	11).	 It	 can	govern	
effectively	 without	 the	 need	 for	 a	 massive	 transfer	 of	 competences	 and	 financial	 resources.	 It	 relies	
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entirely	 on	 soft	 (ideational)	 inducements	 and	 the	 voluntary	 cooperation	 of	 intermediaries	 that	 are	
intrinsically	motivated	(Abbott	et	al.	2015b,	724).	Thus,	it	is	more	likely	to	receive	public	endorsement.	A	
thin	legal	and	political	basis	-	such	as	a	Commission	Decision	-	is	sufficient	to	establish	an	orchestrating	
expert	body.	This	allows	a	supranational	actor	to	bypass	member	states	to	pursue	deeper	integration	in	
policy	areas	 in	which	member	states	are	 loath	to	delegate	competences	because	 it	would	encroach	on	
their	own	‘core	state	powers’	(Genschel	and	Jachtenfuchs	2014).	Fiscal	policy	is	such	a	core	state	power	
that	has	traditionally	been	insulated	from	the	reach	of	supranational	agency.	To	improve	the	compliance	
with	the	fiscal	rules	the	Commission	set	up	the	EFB	whose	task	is	to	monitor	the	compliance	with	EMU’s	
fiscal	framework	and	to	cooperate	with	national	fiscal	councils	(Asatryan	et	al.	2017).	However,	the	EFB	
has	no	enforcement	capacity	on	its	own	that	could	coerce	member	states	into	respecting	the	fiscal	rules.	
It	neither	possesses	strong	executive	and	legislative	powers	nor	financial	independence.	But	it	can	try	to	
enlist	the	existing	authority	of	‘functionally-autonomous’	national	fiscal	councils	to	govern	the	fiscal	policy	
choices	of	governments	indirectly.	Thus,	the	Commission’s	EFB	(orchestrator)	could	govern	fiscal	policy	by	
relying	on	national	fiscal	councils	(intermediaries)	whose	governance	goals	partially	overlap	with	those	of	
the	orchestrator.		
III. Member	States	granting	Authority		
	
a. The	European	Stability	Mechanism	(ESM)	as	an	Agent		
	
On	the	27th	of	September	2012,	the	ESM	became	fully	operational	with	a	maximum	lending	capacity	of	
€500bn	(Gocaj	and	Meunier	2013;	Verdun	2015;	Jones,	Kelemen,	and	Meunier	2016;	Ban	and	Seabrooke	
2017).	 Today,	 it	 possesses	 an	 authorized	 capital	 stock	 of	 €704.8bn	 (€80.5bn	 paid-in	 +	 €624.3	 callable	
capital).	The	main	ESM	decision-making	body	–	the	Board	of	Governors	-	consists	of	the	Finance	ministers	
of	the	euro	area	and	is	equivalent	to	the	Eurogroup.	Germany,	France	and	Italy	obtained	a	de	facto	veto	
in	 the	ESM	Board	of	Governors	 that	allows	 them	 to	 individually	block	any	decision	 that	would	 lead	 to	
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further	risk-sharing	(Henning	2017,	172).	Making	the	Eurogroup	the	principal	of	the	ESM	allowed	creditor	
countries	to	keep	a	tight	control	over	the	disbursement	of	financial	assistance.	Weighted	voting	rights	in	
line	with	the	share	of	subscribed	ESM	capital	 further	bolstered	the	 influence	of	the	 larger	contributing	
member	states.		
Several	 political	 economy	 considerations	 played	 a	 role	 during	 the	 ESM’s	 creation.	 First,	 a	 permanent	
bailout	mechanism	would	 put	 a	 higher	 financial	 burden	 on	 European	 taxpayers	 due	 to	 the	 increased	
financial	commitments.	While	the	EFSF	had	only	been	backed	up	by	guarantees	of	the	euro	area	member	
states,	 a	permanent	bailout	 fund	would	 require	upfront	paid-in	 capital	 (Ban	and	Seabrooke	2017,	12).	
Second,	there	was	uncertainty	about	whether	a	limited	treaty	change	(Art.	136	TFEU)	under	the	fast	track	
treaty	amending	procedure	(Art.	48(6)	TEU)	was	sufficient	to	pass	the	hurdle	of	the	German	Constitutional	
Court	which	later	ruled	that	any	fiscal	transfers	to	the	ESM	needed	parliamentary	approval.	Third,	the	new	
intergovernmental	 ESM	 treaty	 required	 a	 fresh	 round	of	 parliamentary	 ratification,	which	had	 already	
proven	to	be	politically	costly	in	the	case	of	its	predecessor	the	European	Financial	Stability	Facility	(EFSF).	
The	 ability	 to	 tap	 the	 ESM	 was	 made	 conditional	 upon	 the	 prior	 ratification	 of	 the	 Fiscal	 Compact	
(Schimmelfennig	2014).	Fourth,	compared	 to	 the	EFSF,	 the	ESM	would	be	equipped	with	an	expanded	
toolkit	 that	 would	 entail	 the	 ability	 to	 intervene	 in	 debt	 markets	 and	 to	 recapitalize	 banks.	 Both	
instruments	were	politically	highly	contested.		
Why	was	delegation	preferred	over	alternative	modes	of	indirect	governance?	To	answer	this	question,	it	
is	helpful	to	briefly	review	the	proposals	to	turn	the	ESM	into	a	trustee	-	a	European	Monetary	Fund	(EMF)1	
(European	Commission	2017a;	Federal	Government	of	Germany	2018;	Centeno	2018).	The	transition	to	
an	EMF	would	entail	the	transferal	of	new	competences	at	the	expense	of	a	loss	of	control	for	member	
states	if	it	were	to	be	integrated	into	the	EU	Treaty	framework	(Henning	2017,	251).	Over	time,	the	ESM	
																																								 																				
1	The	idea	had	already	surfaced	during	the	onset	of	the	eurozone	crisis	(Mayer	2009;	Gros	and	Mayer	2010).	
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has	become	increasingly	involved	in	the	monitoring	of	conditionality	and	could	ultimately	substitute	the	
troika	(Ban	and	Seabrooke	2017).	Following	the	Franco-German	compromise	on	EMU	governance	reforms	
(the	so-called	‘Meseberg	Declaration’),	it	was	decided	at	the	Euro	Summit	on	29	June	2018	that	the	ESM	
will	provide	a	common	backstop	to	the	Single	Resolution	Fund	(SRF)	(European	Council	2018).	In	a	letter	
sent	to	the	European	Council	President,	the	Eurogroup	President	Mario	Centeno	suggested	that	the	ESM	
could	also	expand	its	toolkit	with	new	financial	instruments	(Centeno	2018).	However,	‘once	the	common	
backstop	for	the	SRF	is	in	place,	it	should	replace	the	direct	bank	recapitalization	instrument,	in	order	to	
release	ESM	lending	capacity’	(Centeno	2018).	Furthermore,	in	its	proposal	the	Commission	envisioned	a	
streamlining	of	the	decision-making	procedures	so	that	‘reinforced’	qualified	majority	voting	(QMV)	would	
apply	to	all	decisions	concerning	stability	support,	the	disbursements	of	funds	and	the	deployment	of	the	
backstop.	However,	 the	 reason	why	 the	ESM	was	not	designed	as	 an	 independent	 trustee	 is	precisely	
because	it	allowed	member	states	to	control	the	disbursements	of	funds.	Its	main	purpose	was	to	harness	
the	benefits	of	pooling	financial	resources	and	thereby	lower	the	borrowing	costs	for	stressed	member	
states.	For	these	benefits	to	materialize,	 it	was	not	necessary	to	enlist	 independent	expertise.	Ban	and	
Seabrooke	 (2017,	 10)	 observed	 that	 ‘institutionally,	 the	 ESM	 is	 a	 ‘Catch-22’:	 it	 is	 a	 policy	 instrument	
intended	to	provide	‘bail-outs’,	in	the	context	of	the	EU	founding	treaties	that	prevent	bail-outs.’	The	only	
way	 to	 make	 this	 institutional	 arrangement	 acceptable	 to	 mass	 publics	 in	 creditor	 countries	 was	 to	
demonstrate	that	governments	would	be	in	charge	of	any	disbursement	decisions	and	that	these	would	
be	linked	to	strict	conditionality.	The	involvement	of	national	parliaments	was	key	in	minimizing	the	risk	
of	future	agency	loss	for	large	contributing	member	states.	Henning	(2017,	173)	pointed	out	that	‘through	
domestic	 ratification	 of	 European	 decisions	 on	 financial	 assistance	 by	 unanimity,	 Germany	 ensured	
maximum	control	over	the	use	of	common	financial	facilities,	fiscal	exposure	through	them,	and	equally	
importantly,	the	conditions	to	which	borrowers	were	required	to	adhere’.	In	sum,	delegation	turned	out	
to	be	the	preferred	mode	because	it	ensured	that	the	agent	would	not	behave	inimical	to	the	principal’s	
preferences.		
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b. The	European	Central	Bank	(ECB)	as	a	Trustee		
	
Majone	 (2001)	 has	 convincingly	 argued	 that	 non-majoritarian	 institutions	 such	 as	 independent	 central	
banks	 do	 not	 follow	 the	 conventional	 P-A	 logic.	 He	 contends	 that	 their	 theoretical	 features	 are	 best	
captured	by	the	trusteeship	model	(see	also	Grant	and	Keohane	(2005);	Abbott	et	al.	(2018)).	According	to	
the	Anglo-American	legal	tradition,	‘a	trust	is	a	situation	where	the	owner	of	some	property	[…]	transfers	
it	to	a	“trustee”	with	the	stipulation	that	the	trustee	should	not	treat	it	as	her	own	but	manage	it	for	the	
benefit	of	the	“beneficiary”’	(Majone	2001,	113).	The	transferal	of	such	far-reaching	competences	requires	
a	high	level	of	trust	that	the	trustee	will	refrain	from	acting	outside	of	her	mandate.	This	is	why	this	type	
of	 interaction	 is	 often	described	as	 a	 ‘fiduciary	 relationship’	 (Hadfield	1997,	 142).	 Subsequently,	 if	 the	
trustee	is	perceived	to	act	outside	of	its	mandate,	a	dramatic	loss	of	trust	is	likely	to	be	the	consequence	
(Tesche	2018a).												
With	the	creation	of	the	ECB	the	euro	area	member	states	have	effectively	relinquished	their	monetary	
sovereignty.	By	delegating	authority	in	the	realm	of	monetary	policy	to	an	independent	central	bank,	a	
government	 can	 enhance	 its	 credible	 commitment	 to	 pursue	 anti-inflationary	 policies	 (Kydland	 and	
Prescott	1977).	A	central	bank	that	functions	as	the	agent	of	the	government	would	lack	the	credibility	to	
firmly	anchor	long-term	inflation	expectations	due	to	the	time-inconsistency	problem.	The	euro	area	crisis	
has	 bolstered	 Majone’s	 conceptualization	 of	 the	 ECB	 as	 a	 trustee.	 First,	 it	 has	 confirmed	 that	 the	
Maastricht	 treaty	 is	 an	 incomplete	 contract	 that	 entails	 open-ended	 commitments	 such	 as	 the	 broad	
objective	to	‘maintain	price	stability’	(Torres	2013,	293).	But	it	has	also	forcefully	revealed	unanticipated	
future	contingencies	that	this	incomplete	contract	failed	to	take	into	account	like	the	threat	of	financial	
dominance,	 i.e.	the	ability	of	the	financial	 industry	to	shift	the	costs	of	bailouts	onto	either	the	central	
bank	or	 the	 fiscal	 authorities	 (Brunnermeier,	 James,	 and	 Landau	2016,	 206).	 Second,	 to	 safeguard	 the	
viability	of	the	currency	union	the	ECB	used	its	full	discretion	to	reinterpret	what	constitutes	monetary	
policy.	Draghi’s	London	speech	‘to	do	whatever	it	takes’	illustrates	that	a	less	independent,	hierarchically-
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managed	central	bank	would	not	have	been	able	to	deal	with	the	eurozone	crisis	 in	such	a	competent	
manner.	On	the	other	hand,	it	demonstrated	that	member	states	have	few	means	of	ex	post	sanctioning	
if	they	find	that	the	trustee	has	acted	outside	of	its	mandate	(Brunnermeier,	James,	and	Landau	2016,	122-
4).	After	granting	authority	to	a	trustee,	the	trustor’s	initial	authority	might	gradually	be	inverted	(Abbott	
et	al.	2018,	10).	Even	though	the	CJEU	ruled	that	OMT	was	in	line	with	the	treaties	(Zilioli	2016;	Kreuder-
Sonnen	2016;	Schoeller	2018),	the	typical	ex	post	controls	that	principals	usually	deploy	to	sanction	the	
agent	 if	 it	 strays	 beyond	 its	 mandate	 are	 less	 effective	 because	 a	 trusteeship	 is	 managed	 in	 a	 non-
hierarchical	 fashion.	This	 is	 the	drawback	of	a	strong	commitment	to	price	stability.	Eurozone	member	
states	realized	that	they	had	become	dependent	on	the	ECB	willingness	to	exercise	its	lender	of	last	resort	
function.	They	had	issued	debt	in	a	currency	over	which	they	had	relinquished	control	(De	Grauwe	2013).	
As	the	eurozone	crisis	proceeded,	they	had	to	implement	structural	reforms	at	the	behest	of	the	ECB	to	
overcome	its	reluctance	to	act	as	a	lender	of	last	resort	(Henning	2016).		
The	unanimous	decision	by	the	European	Council	to	activate	the	‘enabling	clause’	(Art.127(6))	that	allowed	
it	to	entrust	the	ECB	with	micro-prudential	supervision	arose	out	of	the	need	for	a	credible	commitment	
to	 ‘break	 the	 sovereign-bank	 nexus’	 (Véron	 2015).	 The	 ECB	 was	 adamant	 that	 a	 Single	 Supervisory	
Mechanism	(SSM)	was	essential	for	the	viability	of	EMU.	The	central	bank’s	policy	entrepreneurship	led	to	
the	convergence	of	member	states’	preferences	and	decisively	contributed	to	its	entrustment	(De	Rynck	
2016).	 Two	 reasons	 explain	 why	 member	 states	 were	 willing	 to	 forego	 the	 control	 associated	 with	
delegation	and	instead	opted	for	competence-based	trusteeship.	First,	the	only	other	existing	institution	
that	had	the	capacity	to	do	the	job	–	the	EBA	-	had	suffered	from	a	severe	loss	of	credibility	during	the	
failed	bank	stress	tests	of	2011	(Glöckler,	Lindner,	and	Salines	2017,	1147).	Moreover,	the	EBA	was	less	
independent	 and	 lacked	 the	 powerful	 executive	 and	 legislative	 decision-making	 powers	 of	 the	 ECB.	
Second,	national	banking	supervisors	had	lost	credibility	due	to	national	regulatory	forbearance	vis-à-vis	
their	‘national	champions’	(Epstein	and	Rhodes	2016).	The	SSM	provided	a	credible	commitment	to	end	
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this	practice	by	supervising	significant	banks	directly	and	less	significant	banks	indirectly	from	Frankfurt	
(Gren,	 Howarth,	 and	Quaglia	 2015).	 The	 downstream	 consequence	 of	 further	 empowering	 an	 already	
competent	trustee	will	increase	the	likelihood	of	authority	inversion.	Like	in	the	realm	of	monetary	policy,	
the	 member	 states	 national	 supervisory	 authority	 might	 gradually	 be	 absorbed	 by	 the	 SSM	 trustee.	
Banking	union	de	facto	equates	to	a	marketization	of	the	traditionally	strong	bank-state	ties	and	will,	thus,	
reduce	national	economic	policy	discretion	further	(Epstein	2017,	182).	As	the	long-term	consequences	of	
trusteeship	fully	emerge	and	banks	become	even	less	responsive	to	governmental	preferences,	member	
states	 might	 increasingly	 favor	 ‘taking	 back	 control’	 by	 moving	 the	 ex	 post	 management	 from	 non-
hierarchically	to	hierarchically	(from	the	north-eastern	quadrant	to	the	north-western	quadrant	in	Figure	
1).	For	a	governor,	it	can	often	be	politically	expedient	to	turn	trustees	into	agents	by	bringing	them	under	
the	shadow	of	hierarchy	to	minimize	agency	loss	at	the	expense	of	endangering	a	credible	commitment.	
But	vice	versa	this	might	not	hold	as	the	case	of	the	ESM	shows.	This	might	explain	why	central	banks	
jealously	 guard	 their	 independence	because	 they	 are	 acutely	 aware	of	 the	political	 dynamics	 that	 can	
quickly	trigger	an	erosion	of	their	authority.	
IV. Supranational	Actors	enlisting	Authority		
a) The	European	Minister	of	Economy	and	Finance	(EMEF)	as	Co-Optor		
	
As	part	of	its	comprehensive	reform	package	‘further	steps	towards	the	completion	of	Europe’s	EMU:	a	
roadmap’	 the	Commission	proposed	 to	establish	a	European	Minister	of	Economy	and	Finance	 (EMEF)	
(European	Commission	2017a).	Such	a	‘double-hatted’	EMEF	would	be	a	Vice-President	of	the	Commission	
and	at	the	same	time	the	President	of	the	Eurogroup.	‘The	European	Minister	would	also	oversee	the	use	
of	 EU	 and	 euro	 area	 budgetary	 instruments	 and	 seek	 to	 maximise	 the	 impact	 in	 support	 of	 shared	
priorities’	 (European	 Commission	 2017a,	 10).	 By	 bundling	 and	 repackaging	 existing	 competences,	 the	
Commission	 enlists	 existing	 authority	 by	 attempting	 to	 co-opt	 the	 Eurogroup	 President.	 For	 a	
supranational	actor	with	limited	authority	it	is	rational	to	pursue	such	a	strategy	because	it	allows	her	to	
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govern	beyond	the	formal	scope	of	her	authority.	The	ECB	has	been	a	long-standing	advocate	of	installing	
a	 political	 counterpart	 at	 the	 euro	 area	 level	 tasked	 with	 fiscal	 surveillance	 and	 macro-economic	
coordination	(Enderlein	and	Haas	2015).	But	recently	also	the	European	Commission	has	found	a	way	how	
it	could	use	the	proposal	to	further	its	own	bureaucratic	self-interest.		
The	Commission’s	EMEF	proposal	demonstrates	the	advantages	of	cooptation	in	the	context	of	European	
integration.	 First,	 a	 EMEF	would	 draw	on	 existing	 competences	 that	would	 be	 bundled	 under	 its	 new	
chairmanship.	Second,	the	Eurogroup	has	become	a	key	informal	intergovernmental	decision-making	body	
largely	insulated	from	the	influence	of	the	Commission	(Puetter	2012;	Hodson	2011).	The	‘double-hatting’	
would	increase	the	co-optee’s	(Eurogroup	President’s)	standing	by	giving	it	more	fiscal	instruments	and	
power	but	also	by	increasing	its	dependence	on	the	co-optor	(European	Commission).	This	would	allow	
the	Commission	to	gradually	invert	the	authority	with	the	objective	to	indirectly	govern	the	agenda	of	the	
Eurogroup	meetings	of	the	Finance	ministers.	However,	it	is	far	from	certain	that	the	member	states	would	
easily	give	up	their	control	over	the	Eurogroup	Presidency.	A	‘double-hatted’	EMEF	would	also	pressure	
the	Eurogroup	to	clarify	its	legal	status	and	therefore	might	have	positive	spillover	effects	in	terms	of	its	
democratic	legitimacy.	In	addition,	the	permanent	Eurogroup	President	serves	as	the	chair	of	the	Board	of	
Governors	of	the	ESM.	Thus,	a	EMEF	would	give	the	Commission	also	more	influence	in	the	governance	of	
the	ESM	and	could	facilitate	its	integration	into	the	treaty	framework.		
Cooptation	 attempts	 to	 counter	 the	 new	 intergovernmental	 dynamics	 that	 give	member	 states	 a	 firm	
intergovernmental	grip	on	the	ESM’s	and	the	Eurogroup’s	decision-making	procedures.	It,	thus,	features	
prominently	 in	the	supranational	toolkit	because	 it	allows	actors	to	(1)	escape	the	straight-jacket	of	 its	
own	 capability	 deficits	 (Abbott	 et	 al.	 2018),	 (2)	 buffer	 the	 intergovernmental	 encroachment	 of	 their	
authority	 and	 (3)	 minimize	 potential	 agency	 loss.	 The	 Commission’s	 desire	 to	 bring	 the	 Eurogroup	
President	under	its	hierarchical	control	results	from	the	latter’s	goals	that	have	diverged	from	those	of	the	
Commission.	Goal	divergence	became	more	pronounced	during	key	episodes	of	the	euro	area	crisis,	for	
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example,	when	former	Eurogroup	President	Dijsselbloem	criticized	the	Commission	for	its	laxness	on	the	
interpretation	of	 the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	 (SGP)	 (Reuters	2016).	As	a	 consequence,	 co-opting	 the	
Eurogroup	President	became	increasingly	attractive	for	the	Commission.	Abbott	et	al.	(2018,	11)	point	out	
that	 ‘like	 trusteeship,	 cooptation	 inverts	 authority	 over	 time,	 but	 in	 reverse:	 ex	 ante	 the	 co-optee	 is	
superior,	as	 the	co-optor	must	bid	 for	 its	 favor;	ex	post	 the	co-optor	 is	 superior,	as	 the	co-optee	must	
comply	with	its	directives’.	Thus,	a	EMEF	is	likely	to	gradually	divert	agenda	setting	powers	away	from	the	
member	states	towards	the	European	level.	Many	practical	hurdles	would	have	to	be	cleared	with	regards	
to	 the	 EMEF’s	 legal	 status,	 political	 accountability	 and	 mandate	 (see	 Xanthoulis	 2018).	 Even	 if	 the	
prospects	 for	 its	 implementation	 are	 slim,	 the	 EMEF	 proposal	 neatly	 illustrates	 how	 cooptation	 as	 an	
integration	strategy	would	allow	the	supranational	actor	to	broaden	the	reach	beyond	the	boundaries	of	
its	formal	authority.		
b) The	Commission’s	European	Fiscal	Advisory	Board	(EFB)	as	an	Orchestrator		
	
The	European	Commission	as	the	‘guardian	of	the	treaties’	is	supposed	to	monitor	the	compliance	with	
EMU’s	fiscal	framework,	however,	it	possesses	only	weak	enforcement	powers	to	govern	effectively.	At	
the	same	time,	member	states	are	reluctant	to	cede	control	over	a	 ‘core	state	power’	 like	 fiscal	policy	
(Genschel	and	Jachtenfuchs	2016).	To	foster	local	ownership	with	the	fiscal	rules	the	six-pack,	two-pack	
and	 the	 Fiscal	 Compact	mandated	all	 euro	area	 countries	 to	establish	 ‘functionally	 autonomous’	 fiscal	
councils	at	the	national	level	(Fasone	and	Griglio	2013;	Fromage	2017).	The	rationale	of	member	states	to	
set	 up	 fiscal	 councils	 was	 straightforward.	 The	 euro	 area	 crisis	 increased	 the	 demand	 for	 credible	
commitment	devices	that	held	out	the	promise	to	allay	financial	markets’	debt	sustainability	concerns	and	
to	help	lowering	sovereign	borrowing	costs.	An	independent	body	of	fiscal	experts	is	supposed	to	produce	
unbiased	assessments,	recommendations	and	reports	of	a	government’s	fiscal	stance	and	macroeconomic	
projections	(Beetsma	and	Debrun	2016).	In	contrast	to	independent	central	banks,	fiscal	councils	currently	
lack	the	hard	control	over	policy	 instruments	to	govern	a	target	directly	(Larch	and	Braendle	2018).	By	
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providing	 impartial	 fiscal	 assessments	 of	 the	 ‘true’	 fiscal	 stance	 of	 a	 government	 to	 parliamentarians,	
voters,	the	media	and	other	intermediaries	such	as	credit	rating	agencies,	a	fiscal	council	can	indirectly	
orchestrate	 fiscal	 discipline	 and,	 thereby,	 improve	 the	 compliance	 with	 the	 fiscal	 rules	 (Beetsma	 and	
Debrun	 2017).	 In	 some	 euro	 area	 countries,	 national	 fiscal	 councils	 already	 function	 as	 reputable	
watchdogs	with	a	heightened	public	profile	that	can	increase	the	political	costs	for	governments	pursuing	
fiscally	profligate	policies	(Horvath	2018).	
Enlisting	 existing	 authority	 is	 a	 means	 by	 which	 a	 supranational	 actor	 can	 resist	 intergovernmental	
encroachment	on	its	own	authority	and	make	credible	commitments.	The	diffusion	of	fiscal	councils	across	
the	 EU	 posed	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	 Commission	 because	 it	 threatened	 to	 lead	 to	 inconsistent	 rule	
interpretations	 further	 eroding	 compliance	 (Jankovics	 and	 Sherwood	 2017,	 29).	 The	 Commission’s	
commitment	to	strict	rule	enforcement	had	suffered	severely	due	to	its	discretionary	interpretations	of	
the	various	flexibility	clauses	in	the	SGP.	To	regain	its	lost	credibility	it	was	necessary	to	set	up	a	‘watchdog	
for	another	watchdog’	(Asatryan	et	al.	2017).	Naturally,	the	Commission	wanted	to	guard	its	role	as	the	
‘fiscal	rule	interpreter	of	last	resort’	(Tesche	2018b,	9)	and	tried	to	prevent	the	new	national	challengers	
from	infringing	upon	its	monopoly	power.	Hence,	a	new	body	was	needed	to	cooperate	with	national	fiscal	
councils,	exchange	best	practices,	and	produce	common	knowledge	about	the	fiscal	rules.	The	idea	to	set	
up	a	European	Fiscal	Board	(EFB)	was	first	proposed	in	the	Five	Presidents’	Report	(Juncker	et	al.	2015,	
Annex	3).	 The	EFB	was	 formally	established	on	1	November	2015	and	became	 fully	operational	on	19	
October	 2016	 after	 the	College	of	 Commissioners	 appointed	 its	members	 based	on	 a	 proposal	 by	 the	
Commission	President.	 It	 consists	of	 a	 chair	 and	 four	 additional	members	 to	be	appointed	 for	3	 years	
(renewable	 once).	 The	 members	 of	 the	 EFB	 should	 act	 independently	 and	 should	 adopt	 advice	 by	
consensus.	In	October	2017,	the	EFB	published	its	first	Annual	Report	covering	a	wide	range	of	topics	from	
the	appropriate	euro	area	fiscal	stance	to	SGP	reform	proposals	(European	Fiscal	Board	2017).		
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The	EFB	attempts	to	enlist	existing	authority	by	relying	on	national	fiscal	councils	(the	intermediaries)	to	
orchestrate	 fiscal	 discipline	 indirectly.	 The	 EFB’s	 direct	 interference	 with	 member	 states’	 fiscal	 policy	
choices	 is	 prohibited.	 Instead,	 it	 can	 compensate	 for	 its	 own	 capability	 deficits	 by	 relying	 on	 the	
intermediaries’	local	ownership	and	superior	legitimacy	with	regards	to	the	targets	(Abbott	et	al.	2018).	
The	advantage	of	this	indirect	mode	of	governance	is	that	the	orchestrator	can	effectively	govern	on	a	thin	
legal	and	political	basis.	The	legal	instrument	to	establish	the	EFB	–	a	Commission	Decision	–	demonstrates	
the	Commission’s	reluctance	to	use	a	stronger	legal	basis	that	would	have	entailed	to	take	on	board	the	
member	states’	preferences	(Asatryan	et	al.	2017).	This	allowed	the	Commission	to	bypass	member	states	
and	to	write	a	mandate	for	the	EFB	in	line	with	its	institutional	self-interest.	According	to	the	Commission’s	
decision	of	21	October	2015	(2015/1937)	the	EFB’s	task	is	the	‘evaluation	of	the	implementation	of	the	
Union	 fiscal	 framework,	 in	 particular	 regarding	 the	 horizontal	 consistency	 of	 the	 decisions	 and	
implementation	of	budgetary	surveillance,	cases	of	particularly	serious	non-compliance	with	the	rules,	and	
the	appropriateness	of	the	actual	fiscal	stance	at	the	euro	area	and	national	level.’	In	case	the	EFB	identifies	
risks	to	the	proper	functioning	of	EMU,	it	can	recommend	specific	policy	options	under	the	SGP.	Former	
Eurogroup	President	Dijsselbloem	referred	 to	 the	EFB	as	 ‘the	big	European	sister	of	 the	national	 fiscal	
councils’	(Foy	2015).	However,	national	fiscal	councils	are	adamant	about	safeguarding	their	institutional	
independence	and	are	reluctant	to	embrace	the	EFB	as	a	central	coordinator	of	their	network	(Asatryan	
et	al.	2017).	As	part	of	its	December	2017	reform	package	the	Commission	has	proposed	a	directive	that	
would	significantly	strengthen	the	operational	capacity	of	national	fiscal	councils	(European	Commission	
2017b).	The	directive	would	provide	national	fiscal	councils	with	more	enforcement	tools	in	case	of	non-
compliance	with	the	fiscal	rule	framework.	At	first	sight,	it	seems	surprising	that	the	Commission	is	willing	
to	further	increase	the	competence	and	independence	of	national	intermediaries	at	the	expense	of	a	loss	
of	control.	However,	an	orchestrator	can	compensate	for	a	loss	of	control	by	seeking	a	higher	level	of	goal	
alignment	between	itself	and	the	intermediaries	(Abbott	et	al.	2018).	This	is	precisely	what	the	directive	
would	achieve	because	it	would	make	national	fiscal	councils	complicit	in	punishing	deviations	from	the	
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medium-term	fiscal	objective	 in	 line	with	the	Commission’s	goal	 to	 increase	compliance	with	the	 fiscal	
rules.	In	sum,	orchestrating	fiscal	discipline	can	be	an	attractive	mode	of	indirect	governance	if	the	need	
for	a	credible	commitment	makes	it	necessary	to	give	up	on	control.					
Table	1:	Overview	of	indirect	modes	of	governance	
	 Goals	 Mode	 Consequences	
ESM	 § Provide	financial	assistance	
at	low	borrowing	costs	
against	strict	conditionality	
§ Reduce	the	risk	of	moral	
hazard	related	to	bailout	
funds	
§ Prevent	unlimited	fiscal	
transfers		
Delegation	 § Member	 states	 control	
disbursement	 of	 funds	 and	
decision-making	 (de	 facto	 veto	
right	for	large	MS)	
§ Reduced	 fiscal	 exposure	 and	
national	audience	costs	
§ Preserved	 budgetary	 sovereignty	
of	national	parliaments	
ECB/SSM	 § Severing	 the	 sovereign-bank	
nexus	
§ Stop	 national	 regulatory	
forbearance	 (‘national	
champions’)	
§ Financial	stability	
§ Harness	 synergies	 between	
micro-	 and	 macroprudential	
supervision	
§ End	the	era	of	bank	bailouts	
Trusteeship	 § Marketization	 of	 traditionally	
strong	bank-state	ties		
§ Reduction	 of	 national	 economic	
policy	discretion	over	time	
§ Credible	 commitment	 to	 financial	
stability		
§ SSM’s	authority	is	likely	to	increase	
over	 time	 as	 more	 banks	 will	 be	
supervised	 directly	 at	 the	
European	level	
§ Few	 effective	 ex	 post	 controls	 to	
sanction	the	trustee	
EMEF	 § Supranational	 control	 of	 the	
Eurogroup	Presidency	
§ Agenda-setting	 role	 for	 the	
Commission	in	the	Eurogroup	
§ Align	 the	 goals	 of	 the	
Eurogroup	more	 closely	with	
the	Commission’s	
Cooptation	 § Gradually	 divert	 agenda	 setting	
powers	 away	 from	 the	 member	
states	towards	the	European	level	
§ Broaden	 the	 reach	 beyond	 the	
boundaries	 of	 the	 Commission’s	
formal	authority	
§ Severing	 intergovernmental	 grip	
on	the	ESM’s	and	the	Eurogroup’s	
decision-making	procedures	
EFB	 § Evaluation	 of	 the	
implementation	of	the	Union	
fiscal	framework		
§ Improve	compliance	with	the	
SGP	 (lower	 debt	 levels	 and	
budget	 deficits)	 and	 make	
reform	proposals	
§ Assess	euro	area	fiscal	stance	
§ Cooperate	with	national	fiscal	
councils		
Orchestration	 § Limit	discretionary	interpretations	
of	the	fiscal	rules	
§ Enlist	 national	 fiscal	 councils	 to	
govern	fiscal	policy	indirectly	
§ Increase	 local	 ownership	 of	 and	
compliance	with	the	fiscal	rules	
§ Commission	 can	 bypass	 member	
states	as	veto	players	
§ Strengthening	 of	 horizontal	
consistency	 of	 the	 decisions	 and	
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§ Reestablish	 the	 credibility	 of	
the	Commission	as	a	credible	
rule	monitor	
implementation	 of	 budgetary	
surveillance	
§ overcome	 credible	 commitment	
problems	despite	scarce	authority	
in	 fiscal	 policy	 at	 the	 European	
level	
Source:	author's	own	compilation	
	
V. Conclusion	
	
The	 traditional	 intergovernmental	 modes	 of	 indirect	 governance	 are	 delegation	 and	 trusteeship.	 This	
article	 has	 shown	 that	 by	 enlisting	 authority	 either	 through	 cooptation	 or	orchestration	 supranational	
actors	can	deepen	European	integration	despite	the	new	dynamics	that	would	rather	see	a	repatriation	of	
their	authority	to	the	national	level.	The	two	cases,	EMEF	and	EFB,	indicate	that	the	latter	two	modes	of	
indirect	governance	feature	prominently	in	the	integration	toolkit	of	the	European	Commission.	Indirect	
governance	allows	supranational	agency	to	bypass	potential	veto	points	controlled	by	intergovernmental	
forces	and	thereby	govern	beyond	the	scope	of	their	formal	authority.	It	also	provides	the	opportunity	to	
reign	 in	 intergovernmental	 fora	 like	the	Eurogroup	by	coopting	 its	President	through	 increased	powers	
and	prestige.	 In	 the	post-euro	crisis	period,	 the	Commission	might	 increasingly	 rely	on	cooptation	 and	
orchestration	as	modes	of	indirect	governance	(Abbott	et	al.	2015a,	2015b,	2018)	because	they	address	
various	challenges	that	the	European	integration	process	faces	at	its	current	juncture.	First,	they	offer	a	
soft	way	of	integration	that	draws	on	the	already	existing	authority	and	capabilities	of	intermediaries	and,	
hence,	 they	 do	 not	 require	 any	 additional	 financial	 resources.	 Thus,	 they	 lower	 the	 price	 of	 deeper	
integration.	Second,	no	treaty	change	is	required	to	establish	a	co-optor	or	an	orchestrator	because	they	
can	operate	on	a	‘thin’	legal	and	political	basis.	An	ordinary	Commission	Decision	that	does	not	involve	co-
legislation	 by	 the	 European	 Parliament	 or	 the	 Council	 is	 often	 sufficient.	 Third,	 cooptation	 can	 help	
supranational	actors	to	reign	in	powerful	intergovernmental	actors	(like	the	Eurogroup	President)	whose	
preferences	have	diverged	from	its	own.	Fourth,	orchestration	can	help	supranational	actors	to	overcome	
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credible	commitment	problems	despite	their	scarce	authority.	The	creation	of	the	EFB	marked	a	crucial	
step	towards	regaining	the	lost	credibility	of	the	Commission’s	enforcement	capacity	regarding	its	fiscal	
rule	framework.	However,	the	article	has	also	revealed	that	cooptation	and	orchestration	can	encounter	
several	obstacles.	The	co-optor	might	not	be	able	to	offer	enough	benefits	to	the	co-optee	to	bring	him	
under	the	shadow	of	hierarchy.	The	Eurogroup	President	is	a	powerful	actor	in	its	own	right	and	does	not	
need	to	be	a	Vice-President	of	the	Commission	to	heighten	her	standing	because	she	has	the	backing	of	
the	collective	eurozone	Finance	Ministers.	Similarly,	enlisting	intermediaries	can	be	challenging.	National	
fiscal	councils	might	prefer	to	pronounce	their	independence	rather	than	being	orchestrated	by	the	EFB.		
Furthermore,	the	case	of	the	ESM	helps	us	to	distinguish	agents	from	trustees	in	a	more	granular	way.	
Alter	(2008,	38-44)	has	highlighted	three	essential	features	characterizing	a	trustee	vis-à-vis	an	agent:	(1)	
reputation	 and	 (2)	 large	 discretionary	 decision-making	 authority	 based	 on	 the	 trustee’s	 professional	
criteria/judgement	(3)	on	behalf	of	a	beneficiary.	This	has	important	downstream	consequences	for	the	
politics	between	the	principal	and	the	agent/trustee.	The	dynamics	of	P-A	relationships	are	dominated	by	
the	 credible	 threat	 to	 engage	 in	 recontracting	 if	 the	 agent	 behaves	 in	ways	 inimical	 to	 the	 principal’s	
preferences.	If	the	ESM	would	take	risky	decisions	that	would	endanger	its	financial	resources,	member	
states	would	step	in.	In	contrast,	trustees	possess	an	‘independent	source	of	authority’	that	protects	them	
from	political	 interference	 (Alter	2008,	41).	Decisions	by	 the	ECB/SSM	cannot	be	easily	subverted	by	a	
displeased	 principal.	 However,	 this	 will	 pose	 challenges	 to	 its	 democratic	 legitimacy	 if	 the	 trustee	 is	
increasingly	perceived	as	a	‘strategic	political	player’	(Torres	2013;	Henning	2016).	
Finally,	the	analysis	has	larger	ramifications	for	the	study	of	EU	agency	relations	in	a	multi-level	governance	
context	(Dehousse	1997).	We	know	that	the	complex	interplay	between	networks	and	agencies	can	lead	
to:	 (1)	 agencies	 coopting	 networks	 –	 what	 Levi-Faur	 (2011)	 has	 termed	 ‘agencified	 networks’	 or	 (2)	
networks	empowering	agencies	resulting	in	‘networked	agencies’.	National	fiscal	councils	have	created	a	
network	of	EU	 independent	 fiscal	 institutions	 (EUIFI)	but	have	shown	reluctance	 to	be	orchestrated	or	
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coopted	by	the	EFB.	Even	though	horizontal	and	vertical	ties	in	the	monitoring	of	the	fiscal	rules	framework	
have	been	strengthened,	the	EUIFI	has	neither	turned	into	an	‘agencified	network’	nor	has	the	EFB	become	
a	full-fledged	‘networked	agency’.		
The	other	cases	discussed	in	this	article	like	the	ESM,	ECB/SSM	and	EMEF	show	a	clear	tendency	towards	
moving	competences	to	the	supranational	level	but	not	without	mobilizing	expertise	and	resources	at	the	
national	level.	Overall,	the	rapid	institutional	change	played	out	against	the	backdrop	of	an	unprecedented	
crisis	that	threatened	the	survival	of	the	euro	area	as	a	whole	(Schimmelfennig	2015).	While	the	crisis	was	
a	major	driver	of	institutional	reform	in	the	case	of	the	ESM	and	the	SSM	(Gocaj	and	Meunier	2013;	De	
Rynck	2016),	it	featured	less	prominently	in	the	case	of	the	EMEF	and	the	EFB.	This	is	notable	because	the	
latter	 two	 examples	 illustrate	 how	 supranational	 actors	 can	 deepen	 integration	 even	 without	 strong	
intergovernmental	backing	in	‘normal	times’.	Many	scholars	have	interpreted	the	crisis	through	a	historical	
institutionalist	perspective	in	which	path	dependency	and	critical	junctures	ultimately	have	determined	
the	crisis	outcome	(Gocaj	and	Meunier	2013;	Verdun	2015;	Jones,	Kelemen,	and	Meunier	2016;	Capoccia	
and	Kelemen	2007).	An	alternative	way	of	understanding	the	rapid	institutional	change	during	the	euro	
area	crisis	would	be	to	apply	the	concept	of	‘chronic	 instability’	proposed	by	Bernhard	(2015).	 ‘Chronic	
instability’	conceptualized	as	‘multiple,	frequent,	and	connected	episodes	of	disjunctive	change’	(Bernhard	
2015,	977)	might	offer	innovative	insights	into	one	of	Europe’s	most	severe	crises.																		
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